Omnibus Claims: The Latest Caselaw

In 2025, we reported on the case of Angel v Black Horse Ltd [2025] EWHC 490 (KC), a decision made on appeal from the County Court to the High Court in relation to so-called ‘omnibus’ claims.  This has now been the subject of a further appeal to the Court of Appeal.

By way of recap, Angel concerns the use of a single claim form issued by multiple claimants all with similar claims, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule (“CPR”) 7.3.  This provision simply says that “a claimant may use a single claim form to start all claims which can be conveniently disposed of in the same proceedings”, but the reference to a claimant in the singular includes multiple claimants, because CPR 19.1 provides that “any number of claimants […] may be joined as parties to a claim”.  The alternative options are: representative claims brought under CPR 19.8 (where one party sues in their own right, but also on behalf of others); group litigation orders under CPR 19.21; or each claimant simply issuing their own claim form in the normal way.  The latter of course requires each claimant to pay their own court fee referable to the stated value of their claim, hence the attraction of bringing many different claims in one claim form, in order to take advantage of the maximum court fee of £10,000.

In Angel the first of these options was selected.  The individual cases all concerned motor finance commission claims.  Eight claims were issued in total against eight different finance companies, but involving more than 5,800 claimants in total.  Their claims were brought under ss.140A-140B of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (“CCA 74”), alleging that the undisclosed commission agreements entered into between the finance houses and brokers on the one hand created unfair relationships between the customers and the finance companies on the other.  Such claims are highly fact-specific and require the court to look at the entire course of the relationship, from the pre-contract negotiations phase, through to the terms actually agreed, and finally the means of enforcement (if any) pursued by the creditor.

The litigation was being managed by His Honour Judge Worster.  He held that the claims could not be conveniently disposed of together within the meaning of CPR 7.3.  Around the same time, similar decisions had been reached at first instance in other omnibus claims, including by Master Davison in Abbott and 3,499 others v Ministry of Defence [2022] EWHC 1807 (QB) (a case involving claims relating to deafness caused by the claimants’ service in the military) and by Mr Justice Nicklin (albeit in relation to multiple defendants rather than claimants) in Thurrock Council v Stokes and others [2022] EWHC 1998.

However, the Divisional Court in the Abbott case heard an appeal from Master Davison’s decision and determined that the claim could proceed, holding (among other things) that normally the most important factor is the degree of commonality between the various causes of action being pursued by the various claimants.  This decision was published in time for HHJ Worster to consider it as part of his determination but, nevertheless, he went on to hold that the common issues between the parties were not so significant to warrant all claims proceeding together.

However, on the first appeal, Mr Justice Ritchie did not agree.  He allowed the use of a single claim form against each finance company.  The defendants sought and were granted limited permission for a second appeal.

On the second appeal to the Court of Appeal, handed down on 30 June 2026, the Court held that, in relation to CPR 7.3:

1. Though multiple claimants can use a single claim form, the burden of proving the ‘convenience’ of that approach rests with them, not the defendants.
2. It is not necessary to prove, however, that proceeding in that way is the most convenient way of dealing with the claims, but simply a convenient way.
3. No special meaning is to be given to the word ‘convenient’ in this context, and several matters may be relevant to the assessment of convenience.
4. One possible pointer towards allowing such an approach is the presence of common issues of law and fact between the claims. In particular, if there are common issues across all claims, then the convenience test will probably be met, because those issues can be heard and determined together (normally as part of the trial of a sample of the claims).
5. In that connection, it is not necessary to show that all claims can be heard and determined in a single trial, and so it is entirely possible that the claims issued at the same time in the same claim form will not all reach their conclusion at the same time.
6. Convenience must be considered by reference to all relevant interests, including the court and the court system.

Applying these considerations, the Court of Appeal refused to set aside Ritchie J’s order.  It did, however, criticise the approach taken by the claimants, who had failed to plead any particulars regarding the facts of the individual claims, instead pleading generic common issues only.  However, the Court nevertheless felt that the trial of suitable lead cases would result in a number of findings, both binding and persuasive, which may then illustrate which claims were likely to fail and to succeed, and in the process assist with the settlement of some or all of the wider litigation.  It also criticised the heavy costs which had already been incurred by the parties, even though the litigation was barely yet underway.

The Court was also at pains to point out that what it was attempting to do was “knock this litigation into some sort of shape”, and that in doing so the Court had little room for manoeuvre, in part because it was being asked to overturn case management decisions made in the courts below (normally, a very difficult task for any appellant to accomplish, as a wide degree of leniency is given to first instance judges when it comes to case management).  The claimants had also pointed out that the outcome of the appeal was potentially all or nothing from their perspective—if HHJ Worster’s original decision was restored, the claims would move to various County Court hearing centres around the country and would then be allocated to the small claims track, making the recovery of costs, even in the event of success, all but impossible.  Each claim was likely worth no more than £1,000 and so the economic reality of that approach was clear—the vast majority of the claims would likely not be pursued if each claimant had to issue their own claim form.  This appears to have been a decisive factor in favour of allowing the claims to proceed together.

However, given the procedural context of the appeal, and the general state of the litigation, the Court commented that the case (and its decision) was “an unreliable vehicle for any statement of principle of guidance concerning multi-claimant claims”.

Comment

The Court of Appeal’s decision firmly opens the door for future ‘omnibus’ claims being pursued in respect of secret commission claims against finance houses, where one claim could involve hundreds or even thousands of claimants.  The courts have previously tended to be reluctant to agree such an approach where allegations of unfair relationships are made under the CCA 74, given the highly fact specific enquiry the court must undertake in resolving those disputes.  As the Court commented in Angel, such claims are not difficult ones for County Court judges to determine, but it does take time to do so.  After the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hopcraft litigation, such claims remain available, and indeed are the only realistic private cause of action left for claimants, as claims in the tort of bribery are no long open to them.

The Angel case is unlikely to be the final authority on the issue of omnibus claims.  But the Court’s approach to access to justice, where individual claims are uneconomic to litigate, seems likely to prevail.  Claimants joining such litigation can also take some degree of comfort from the decision in Rowe v Ingenious Media Holdings plc [2020] EWHC 235 (Ch) which held that, in multi-party litigation involving various (unconnected) claimants, the court can sever any joint liability for costs.  It can, for example, apportion the risk of an adverse costs order on a pro-rated basis proportionate to an individual litigant’s financial stake the in case.  But this clearly still poses a risk for any given claimant because they will be liable for at least some element of the defendant’s costs if the claim fails.  There are also obvious pitfalls of separate liability from the perspective of lender-defendants.  However, given the problems being encountered by the FCA’s redress scheme (discussed in our next article), such litigation is one of the few remaining options for customers seeking compensation for undisclosed commissions.

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